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Abstract
This paper analyzes endogenous lobbying over a unidimensional policy issue. Indi-
viduals di¤er in policy preferences and decide either to join one of two opposite interest
lobbies or not to take part in lobbying activities. Once formed, lobbies make contribu-
tions to the incumbent government in exchange for a policy favor as in a common-agency
model. A "sincere-lobby-formation" condition for equilibrium is introduced: an individual
joins a lobby if their gain from the policy change that this lobby might achieve exceeds a
contribution fee. Thus, an equilibrium occurs only if no lobby member would prefer their
lobby to cease to exist. I show the existence of an equilibrium with two organized lobbies.
Individuals with more extreme preferences are more likely to join lobbying activities. I
nd that lobbying somewhat moderates the governments preferences, i.e., it shifts the
nal policy in favor of individuals who are initially disadvantaged by the governments
pro- or anti-policy preferred position. Under a utilitarian government, however, lobbying
does not a¤ect the nal policy, and political competition results in a socially optimal
outcome.
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1. Introduction
One wonders why citizens take part in lobbying when there is always a strong temptation to
free-ride. In this paper, I develop a model of special interest politics, analyzing individuals
decisions to participate in lobbying to inuence a policy issue. It is a complete information
model with a unidimensional policy space. The incumbent government cares about policy
outcomes and lobbies contribution payments. Individuals are assumed to di¤er in their
preferences over a policy. Two lobbies can be organized: a pro-policy lobby and an anti-
policy lobby. Moreover, I assume that there is no cost of forming lobbies, and the lobbying
mechanism is modeled as the common-agency problem of Bernheim and Whinston (1986),
adapted to lobbying by Grossman and Helpman (1994). Each individual decides either to
belong to one of the two lobbies or not to participate in lobbying activities. I propose
an intuitive condition for equilibrium, termed sincere lobby formation: in equilibrium, an
individual joins a lobby if their gain from this lobbys activities exceeds a contribution fee.
In other words, an equilibrium occurs only if no lobby member would prefer their lobby to
stop existing.
Why would individuals behave sincerely in forming lobby groups rather than free-ride?
One possible explanation could be that individuals gain some personal satisfaction from show-
ing allegiance to their special interest group and participate in lobbying unless they cannot
a¤ord it. Another possible answer captures the idea of social-norm individual behavior, i.e.,
individuals take part in lobbying activities (unless they are better o¤ without any lobby)
because it is a social norm of the society. In other words, the social norm may suggest that
one should join a lobby if the gain one gets from lobbying activities is higher than the fee
that one has to pay as a lobby member. Alternatively, one can think of an ethical society
where individuals bear a very high psychological cost if they engage in free-riding. So, unless
the gain from free-riding is very high, citizens will refrain from free-riding to avoid this psy-
chological cost. Smith (2000), in a systematic analysis of postwar lawmaking, showed that
the public does overcome the free-riding problem in the case of issues that a¤ect the interests
of the majority of the population such as tax rates, air pollution and product liability.
Note that Alesina and Rosenthals conditional-sincerity condition for voter equilibrium
applies a similar concept in the context of voting (Alesina and Rosenthal 1995, 1996). On
the other hand, the sincere-lobby-formation condition is somewhat related to a "group rule-
utilitarian" approach to voter turnout (Coate and Conlin 2004, Feddersen and Sandroni
2002, Harsanyi 1980). According to this approach, individuals follow the voting rule that,
if followed by everyone else in their group, would maximize their groups aggregate utility.
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Another related concept is Kantian equilibrium (Roemer 2010). In Kantian equilibrium,
"nobody would prefer that everybody change their e¤orts by the same factor." In other
words, "one should take those actions and only those actions that one would advocate all
others take as well."1 I stress, however, that in my model individuals are motivated by ethical
norms rather than group rule-utilitarian considerations or Kants morals.
I show that there exists an equilibrium with two organized lobbies. Individuals with more
extreme preferences are more likely to be involved in lobbying activities. To be more specic,
in equilibrium, each lobby is characterized by a threshold level of preferences such that all
individuals with more pro-policy views (for the pro-policy lobby) or more anti-policy views
(for the anti-policy lobby) participate in lobbying activities. This is in line with the results of
Glazer and Gradstein (2005) and McCarty et al. (2006) that extremists want to contribute
the most.
I nd that lobbying moderates the governments preferences and shifts the nal policy
outcome in favor of individuals who are initially disadvantaged by the governments pro- or
anti-policy preferred position.
Intuitively, consider the case of a pro-policy government. Individuals with preferences
similar to the governments have less stake in the policy, since they are initially favored by
the governments preferred policy. Anti-policy individuals, however, are disadvantaged by the
governments preferences. Owing to the concavity of preferences, anti-policy individuals gain
more than pro-policy individuals from the same (in absolute value) policy change. Therefore,
they are willing to contribute more to the government for a policy change. As a result, under
a pro-policy government, the anti-policy lobby is more numerous and contributes more than
the pro-policy lobby. The equilibrium policy level is more moderate than the one preferred
by the pro-policy government prior to lobbying, and thus favors anti-policy individuals. A
similar argument, in reverse, applies to the case of an anti-policy government, under which
the equilibrium policy level favors pro-policy individuals.
Under a utilitarian government, lobbying does not a¤ect the policy outcome. In this case
the lobbies "neutralize" one another, so that the pro-policy lobbys bids are matched in the
equilibrium by the anti-policy lobbys bids, and political competition results in a socially
optimal outcome. However, each lobby makes a positive contribution to the government to
avoid an undesired policy promoted by a competitor.
Summing up, this paper rst introduces a new condition for lobby formation equilibrium,
namely, sincere lobby formation: in equilibrium, an individual joins a lobby if their gain
1See Roemer (2010), p. 2.
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from this lobbys activities exceeds the contribution fee. Second, I show that lobbying favors
individuals who are initially disadvantaged by the governments pro- or anti-policy preferred
position. In other words, lobbies act as moderators of the governments preferences. Finally,
I nd that under a utilitarian government, lobbying does not a¤ect the nal policy, and
political competition results in a socially optimal outcome. Nonetheless, lobbies have to
contribute to the government in order to maintain this policy level.
This paper follows the most prevalent approach in the formal literature, based on the as-
sumption that lobbies inuence political decisions through contributions (Baron 1989, Becker
1983, 1985, Snyder 1990). Reviews of this and alternative approaches can be found in Austen-
Smith (1997), Grossman and Helpman (2001), and Persson and Tabellini (2002). I use the
common-agency model of Bernheim and Whinston (1986) applied to lobbying by Grossman
and Helpman (1994). Lobbying is modeled as a "menu auction", where lobbies confront
government with contribution schedules that map any possible policy into a contribution
payment. Several authors have applied the common-agency model of lobbying to study trade
policy, commodity taxation, the provision of local public goods, and other policies (Dixit et
al. 1997, Grossman and Helpman 1996, Helpman and Persson 2001, Persson 1998).
This paper complements the literature on collective action and lobby organization, which
dates back to the seminal work of Olson (1965). Recent contributions have addressed the
question of lobby formation in several di¤erent contexts. Some authors have focused mainly
on the formation of lobbies from exogenously given special interest groups with a xed cost
(Drazen et al. 2007, Felli and Merlo 2006, 2007, Laussel 2006, Leaver and Makris 2006,
Mitra 1999, Redoano 2010). Others have in some way addressed the problem of individuals
decisions to lobby. For example, Damania and Fredriksson (2000, 2003) and Magee (2002)
analyzed incentives for two rms and for n identical rms, respectively, to organize into a
single industry lobby to a¤ect policy outcomes. In turn, Bombardini (2008) proposed an
"optimal lobby criterion" that reads as follows: it is optimal for a rm to "join the lobby" if
the joint surplus of a prospective member rm and the lobby is higher under participation
of the rm. Anesi (2009) analyzed the impact of moral hazard in teams on collective action.
Furusawa and Konishi (2010) suggested a "free-riding-proof core" solution concept for the
problem of the provision of public goods, which determines the formation of a contribution
group, the level of provision of public goods, and the allocation of payo¤s within the group.
There is, however, an important di¤erence between the present work and the papers just
cited. In this paper, I study endogenous lobby formation, where individuals participate in
lobbying once the gain from it exceeds the contribution fee. The model presented here thus
aims not to solve the free-riding problem but rather to study lobby formation in a society
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where, because of ethical norms, some individuals do not free-ride.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 lays out a model. Section 3
describes the common-agency model of lobbying. Section 4 develops the concept of sincere
lobby formation. Section 5 establishes the existence of an equilibrium with two organized
lobbies. Finally, Section 6 concludes the paper.
2. Model
Suppose that a certain policy option y is available to a society. Think of this as a public
project (e.g. a hospital) or a piece of legislation (e.g. an abortion law). The set of feasible
policies is the closed interval [0; 1], where y = 0 stands for the lowest policy level (e.g. no
hospital nancing or no legal abortion) and y = 1 stands for the highest policy level (e.g. a
public hospital or no restrictions on abortion).
The society is inhabited by a large number (formally a continuum) of individuals, where
the size (mass) of the population is normalized to unity. Individuals di¤er in their policy
preferences. Denote by x 2 [0; 1] an individuals preferred policy outcome. (In what follows,
I refer to an individual with an ideal policy x as "individual x".) For ease of exposition, x is
assumed to be distributed in the population uniformly with density 1.2 Individual xs utility
from policy y is given by
ux (y) =   (x  y)2 +m;
where m stands for the amount of money that the individual has.
The incumbent government decides on a policy outcome y. I assume that the government
cares about the policy outcome and about money. Formally, denote by  2    [0; 1]
the governments preferred policy outcome.3 If  < 0:5, the individuals face an anti-policy
government; if  = 0:5, the government is utilitarian; if  > 0:5, the government is pro-policy.
The governments preferences are represented by
U (y) =   (   y)2 +M;
where M denotes the governments monetary payo¤. It is reasonable to assume that the
governments preferences are moderate such that the domain   does not include very extreme
2The qualitative results of this analysis hold for a smooth, well-behaved, symmetric cumulative distribution
function. The assumption of a uniform distribution has been made because it considerably simplies the
analysis.
3One can think of a situation where an o¢ ce holder is a "citizen-candidate" (as in Besley and Coate 1997
or Osborne and Slivinski 1996) with a preferred policy outcome .
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policy levels.4 This assumption is formalized in (4.1) in Section 4.
Policy-making involves not only government decision-making but also special interest pol-
itics, or lobbying. Lobbying is modeled here as a two-stage game. The rst stage of the game
is a lobby formation stage, where individuals decide either to participate in lobbying activities
or not. The second stage of the game is a contribution game, where lobbies (organized in
the rst stage) o¤er the government contributions to a¤ect the policy outcome. The game is
described in detail in the following subsections.
2.1. First Stage: Lobby Formation
I assume that just two lobbies can be formed: a lobby of pro-policy individuals, given by a
set P , and a lobby of anti-policy individuals, given by a set A. Lobby Ps goal is to defend
the special interests of the individuals who are in favor of the policy, while lobby A aims to
defend the special interests of the individuals who prefer low policy levels.
Suppose further that, once formed, these lobbies care about the aggregate utility of their
members. Thus, their gross objective functions are given by
UP (y) =
Z
x2P
ux (y) dx;
UA (y) =
Z
x2A
ux (y) dx:
Each individuals choice is either to be a member of one of two lobbies, P or A, or not
to participate in lobbying activities at all. I assume that each individual can belong just to
one lobby, since in the model lobbies represent opposite interests. There is no xed cost of
forming lobbies. If an individual belongs to a lobby, that individuals utility is taken into
account in the lobbys objective function, but the individual should pay a contribution fee.
How do individuals solve the coordination problem when making their choice? The in-
dividuals here are assumed to be ethical and faithful to their special interest group. The
coordination then has a simple form that I call sincere lobby formation. The sincere-lobby-
formation condition is that in equilibrium, individuals join a lobby if their gain from lobbying
activities exceeds the contribution fee. In other words, an equilibrium occurs only if no lobby
member would prefer their lobby to cease to exist. Intuitively, if a lobby member would
like their lobby to cease to exist, then they are "lobbying" in the "wrong" way given their
expectations and preferences.5
4This assumption reects the idea that candidates with extreme views have less electoral support and are
less likely to be elected than ones with moderate preferences.
5Alternatively, one can think of a society inhabited by individuals of two types. The rst type of individuals
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2.2. Second Stage: Contribution Game
I focus on lobbying activities in the context of the common-agency model of Bernheim and
Whinston (1986), adapted to lobbying by Grossman and Helpman (1994). In this approach,
lobbying is modeled as a "menu auction", where lobbies confront government with contribu-
tion schedules that map any possible policy into a contribution payment.
First, each lobby i 2 fP;Ag, noncooperatively and simultaneously, presents its common
agent, the government, with a contribution schedule Ci (y), giving a binding promise of
payment conditional on a chosen policy level y. Following the literature cited in the previous
paragraph, I concentrate on (globally) truthful contribution schedules that satisfy
Ci (y) = max [Ui (y)  bi; 0] ;
where bi is a constant chosen optimally by lobby i. So lobbies reveal their true preferences:
they contribute to the government the maximum amount that they are willing to exchange
for the governments decision. The objective of lobby i is to maximize the net utility of its
members, namely
Ui (y)  Ci (y) :
Second, the government sets y to maximize its utility, where its monetary payo¤ M is
exactly equal to the lobbiescontributions:
  (   y)2 + CP (y) + CA (y) : (2.1)
An equilibrium of the game is a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in the contribution sched-
ules, the chosen policy and the lobbiescompositions. In the following section, the game is
analyzed backwards. First, I solve for the policy level and lobbies contributions. Second, I
examine the individualschoice of participating in lobbying activities.
3. Common-Agency Lobbying
Suppose that two lobbies P and A have been formed. To derive an equilibrium in truthful
strategies, the following lemma is used. (See Bernheim and Whinston 1986 and Dixit et al.
1997 for a proof.)
Lemma 1. The equilibrium policy is Pareto optimal in the bilateral relation between the
government and each lobby.
are free-riders: they never participate in lobbying activities. The second type of individuals are ethical and
faithful to their special interest group: they join a lobby if the gain they get from lobbying activities exceeds
the contribution fee. The qualitative analysis remains the same for this alternative interpretation of the model.
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Therefore, the equilibrium policy maximizes the sum of the lobbiesnet objective functionsX
i2fP;Ag
(Ui (y)  Ci (y))
and the governments objective (2.1). This sum equals
  (   y)2 + UP (y) + UA (y) : (3.1)
A rst-order condition of (3.1) yields the equilibrium policy level y:
y = arg max
y2[0;1]

  (   y)2 + UP (y) + UA (y)

:
To nd the contribution levels in the equilibrium, dene yj to be the policy that would
emerge if the contribution o¤ered by lobby i were zero, i; j 2 fP;Ag, j 6= i. So,
yP = arg max
y2[0;1]

  (   y)2 + UP (y)

; (3.2)
yA = arg max
y2[0;1]

  (   y)2 + UA (y)

:
In other words, yj is the policy that would emerge if lobby i were not formed.
Lobby i will raise the constant bi in its truthful contribution schedule to the point where
the government is just indi¤erent between choosing policy yj and choosing the equilibrium
policy y, i.e.,
      yA2 + CA  yA =   (   y)2 + CP (y) + CA (y) ;
      yP 2 + CP  yP  =   (   y)2 + CP (y) + CA (y) :
Now one can solve for the lobbiescontributions in equilibrium. The following proposition
summarizes the results of the lobbiescommon-agency contribution game. Proofs of this and
other propositions are given in the Appendix.
Proposition 1. There exists an equilibrium in truthful strategies such that the equilibrium
policy level is given by
y = arg max
y2[0;1]

  (   y)2 + UP (y) + UA (y)

:
The lobbiesequilibrium contributions are equal to
CP  CP (y) =  
 
   yA2 + (   y)2 + UA  yA  UA (y) ;
CA  CA (y) =  
 
   yP 2 + (   y)2 + UP  yP   UP (y) :
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If there is just one organized lobby, the government derives exactly the same utility as
it would have achieved without any contribution. Thus, a lobby that faces no competition
captures the entire surplus from lobbying activities. If two lobbies compete for the nal
policy, the government captures some surplus from lobbying activities, and each lobby pays
according to the political strength of its rival.
The lobby formation stage of the game is analyzed in the following section.
4. Sincere Lobby Formation
The sincere-lobby-formation condition requires that an equilibrium occurs only if no lobby
member would prefer their lobby to cease to exist. In other words, it implies that individuals
behave ethically  they do not free-ride. So an individual joins a lobby if their gain from
the policy change that this lobby might achieve exceeds a contribution fee, which is assumed
to be the same for all the lobby members.6 Formally, the sincere-lobby-formation condition
reads
if x belongs to lobby P , then ux (y)  ux
 
yA

>
CPR
z2P dz
;
if x belongs to lobby A, then ux (y)  ux
 
yP

>
CAR
z2A dz
:
Two denitions are now introduced.
Denition 1. An indi¤erent pro-policy individual  is an individual whose gain from Ps
lobbying equals Ps contribution fee. Formally,
u (y
)  u
 
yA

=
CPR
z2P dz
:
Denition 2. An indi¤erent anti-policy individual  is an individual whose gain from As
lobbying equals As contribution fee. Formally,
u (y
)  u
 
yP

=
CAR
z2A dz
:
The following proposition characterizes the lobbies compositions in equilibrium. The
proof of the proposition uses the fact that lobby Ps members prefer high policy levels while
lobby As members prefer low policy levels. To reect this conceptual di¤erence between the
two lobbies, it is required that in equilibrium lobby P and lobby A make contributions to
6 In this quasi-linear model, it is reasonable to assume that the contributions should be proportional to the
marginal utility of money, which is the same for all individuals.
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the government in order to raise and to lower, respectively, the nal policy outcome, i.e.,
yA  y  yP .
Proposition 2. If in equilibrium there exist lobby P and lobby A, then
P = fx j x 2 (; 1]g ;
A = fx j x 2 [0; )g :
Intuitively, since for indi¤erent individuals  and  the gain from lobbying equals the
contribution fee, then for individuals with more extreme preferences the gain from the policy
change promoted by the corresponding lobby is denitely greater than the contribution fee
(which is the same for all the lobby members). These individuals behave ethically, they do
not free-ride, and thus they take part in lobbying.
To reect the fact that in equilibrium each individual can belong either to one or to no
lobby, the restriction    is imposed. Furthermore, to formalize the assumption that the
governments preferences are moderate (Section 2), I consider the following domain for the
governments preferred policy:
  = f j  2 [; ]g : (4.1)
The lobbiesgross objective functions read
UP (y; ) =
Z 1

ux (y) dx =   (1  ) y2 +
 
1  2 y   1
3
 
1  3+m (1  ) ;
UA (y; ) =
Z 
0
ux (y) dx =  y2 + 2y   1
3
3 +m:
Then Proposition 1 and (3.2) imply the following corollary (the proof is straightforward).
Corollary 1. The equilibrium policy level with two organized lobbies P and A is equal to
y (; ; ) =
1 + 2   2 + 2
2 (2 +   ) :
The policies that would emerge if one of the lobbies did not contribute are given by
yP (; ) =
1  2 + 2
2 (2  ) ;
yA (; ) =
2 + 2
2 (1 + )
:
The lobbiesequilibrium contributions in the case of two organized lobbies P and A are equal
to
CP (; ; ) =
(1  )2  1 + +  +   2   22
4 (1 + ) (2 +   )2 ;
CA (; ; ) =
2
 
1  2+   2 + 22
4 (2  ) (2 +   )2 :
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In what follows, I show the existence of nonempty organized lobbies P and A, i.e., I nd
 and  such that 0 <      < 1.
5. Equilibrium
The following proposition establishes the existence of an equilibrium with two organized
lobbies.
Proposition 3. For the governments preferred policy  2 [0:3; 0:7], there exists an equilib-
rium with two nonempty lobbies P and A such that
P = fx j x 2 ( () ; 1]g ;
A = fx j x 2 [0;  ())g ;
where  () and  () are implicit functions of  that satisfy
1 +  + 2 + 2   3 (1 + ) = 0;
1  2 + 2   3 (2  ) = 0:
Figure 1 depicts the shapes of the curves
1 + + 2 + 2   3 (1 + ) = 0; (5.1)
1  2 + 2   3 (2  ) = 0
for di¤erent levels of the governments preferred policy . The shaded area represents  
  . In Figures 1a and 1c, the solution to (5.1) does not satisfy     . Indeed, the
intersection of the curves (5.1) does not lie in the shaded area. In Figure 1b, however, the
solution to (5.1) lies in the shaded area and thus yields an equilibrium  (),  (), which
satises  ()     (). Numerical solution of this inequality yields  2 [0:3; 0:7].
Note that this is a unique equilibrium with two organized lobbies.7 The implicit func-
tion theorem is used in the proof. In what follows, I apply this theorem again to provide
comparative-statics results.
7There are also equilibria where no lobbies are organized (i.e.,  = 1,  = 0), where one pro-policy lobby
is organized (i.e.,  = 1
3
+ 2
3
,  = 0) and where one anti-policy lobby is organized (i.e.,  = 1,  = 2
3
).
The comparative statics for these equilibria is quite straightforward, so I skip it and concentrate the analysis
on the equilibrium where there are two organized lobbies.
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Proposition 4. The more pro-policy the government, the less numerous the pro-policy lobby
P and the more numerous the anti-policy lobby A are, i.e.,
d (1  )
d
< 0;
d
d
> 0:
Moreover, the more pro-policy the government, the higher the equilibrium policy level, i.e.,
dy
d
> 0:
Finally, the more pro-policy the government, the lower the pro-policy lobby Ps equilibrium
contribution and the greater the anti-policy lobby As contribution, i.e.,
dCP
d
< 0;
dCA
d
> 0:
Figure 2 depicts the lobbiesequilibrium compositions and the equilibrium policy level y
for the governments preferred policy  2 [0:3; 0:7]. Figure 3 presents the lobbiesequilibrium
contributions for  2 [0:3; 0:7].
Corollary 2. Under an anti-policy government, the pro-policy lobby P is more numerous
and contributes more than the anti-policy lobby A. Lobbying favors pro-policy individuals,
i.e., the equilibrium policy level is greater than the governments preferred level (the policy
level that would emerge without lobbying):
1   > , CP > CA and y >  for  < 0:5:
Under a pro-policy government, the pro-policy lobby P is less numerous and contributes
less than the anti-policy lobby A. Lobbying favors anti-policy individuals, i.e., the equilibrium
policy level is lower than the governments preferred level:
1   < , CP < CA and y <  for  > 0:5:
Under a utilitarian government, the lobbies are of the same size and contribute the same
amount to the government. Lobbying does not a¤ect the policy outcome, i.e., the equilibrium
policy level is equal to the governments preferred level:
1   = , CP = CA and y =  for  = 0:5:
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Thus, lobbying somewhat moderates the governments preferences and favors those in-
dividuals who are initially disadvantaged by the governments preferred policy. Consider a
nonutilitarian government (either anti- or pro-policy). Then individuals whose preferences
di¤er considerably from the governments have more stake in the policy than individuals with
preferences similar to the governments. In other words, owing to the concavity of preferences,
"disadvantaged" individuals are willing to pay more than "favored" individuals for the same
(in absolute value) policy change. As a result, the lobby of "disadvantaged" individuals is
more numerous and contributes more than the lobby of initially "favored" individuals. And
the nal policy goes in favor of the lobby with higher relative political strength, i.e., the lobby
of individuals who are initially disadvantaged by the governments preferred policy.
Under a utilitarian government, lobbying does not a¤ect the policy outcome. In this
case the lobbies "neutralize" one another, so that in equilibrium Ps bids for a higher policy
level are matched by As bids for a lower policy level, and political competition results in
a socially optimal outcome. Nonetheless, each lobby must make a positive contribution in
order to induce the government to choose this outcome rather than one that would be worse
from that lobbys perspective.
The literature claims that the institute of lobbying favors richer strata of a society
(Domho¤1983, Mills 1956). However, the results presented here indicate that it is not welfare
that determines the outcome of lobbying. My model of sincere lobby formation predicts that
lobbying over a particular policy issue favors individuals with more stake in that policy, i.e.,
individuals who are initially disadvantaged by the governments preferences. These individu-
als are ready to contribute more to the government for a policy favor than are the individuals
favored by the governments preferred policy.
Note that the equilibrium policy level under a pro-policy government is higher than that
under an anti-policy government, with or without lobbying. Therefore, the pro-policy indi-
viduals would prefer a pro-policy government to an anti-policy one in spite of the fact that
under the latter they could inuence the nal policy in their favor by lobbying. In turn, the
anti-policy individuals would prefer an anti-policy government to a pro-policy one, even when
they could lobby more successfully under a pro-policy government.
6. Conclusion
The paper has studied the impact of lobbying on government decision-making. I propose a
new equilibrium condition for lobby formation, namely, sincere lobby formation: a citizen
joins a lobby group if their gain from the policy change that this lobby might achieve exceeds
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the contribution fee. This implies that an equilibrium occurs only if no lobby member would
prefer their lobby to stop existing. Lobbying is modeled as a common-agency problem, only
two lobbies can be organized, and there is no cost of forming lobbies.
The analysis shows that there exists an equilibrium where there are two lobbies, which
make positive contributions to the government in exchange for a policy favor. The model
predicts that individuals with more extreme preferences are more likely to participate in
lobbying. Lobbying somewhat moderates the governments preferences and favors individuals
who are initially disadvantaged by the governments preferred policy. Indeed, under a pro-
policy government, lobbying favors anti-policy individuals, i.e., the nal policy outcome is
somewhat more moderate than the one initially preferred by the pro-policy policymakers.
Under an anti-policy government, lobbying moderates the nal policy in favor of pro-policy
individuals. In the case of a utilitarian government, lobbying does not a¤ect the nal policy,
and political competition results in a socially optimal outcome. However, each lobby has to
contribute the same amount to the government to maintain this policy level.
I have focused on a unidimensional policy. However, in reality, public policies pursue
many goals. So it is of interest to study sincere lobby formation under the more realistic
assumption of a multidimensional policy space, where an equilibrium might fail to exist. It
would also be interesting to consider a nonsymmetric distribution of preferences. In this case,
I expect that the qualitative results presented above will still hold (except, probably, those
for the case of a utilitarian government). These tasks are left for future research.
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Figure 2. Equilibrium compositions of lobbies P and A and equilibrium policy level y for
the governments preferred policy  2 [0:3; 0:7].
Figure 3. Equilibrium contributions of lobbies P and A for the governments preferred policy
 2 [0:3; 0:7].
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Appendix
A. Proof of Proposition 1
The lobbiestruthful contribution schedules are
CP (y) = max [UP (y)  bP ; 0] ; (A.1)
CA (y) = max [UA (y)  bA; 0] :
The constants bP and bA in the lobbiestruthful contribution schedules satisfy
      yA2 + CA  yA =   (   y)2 + CP (y) + CA (y) ; (A.2)
      yP 2 + CP  yP  =   (   y)2 + CP (y) + CA (y) :
Plugging (A.1) into (A.2) yields
UP (y
)  bP =  
 
   yA2 + (   y)2 + UA  yA  UA (y) ;
UA (y
)  bA =  
 
   yP 2 + (   y)2 + UP  yP   UP (y) ;
where the rst line is lobby Ps equilibrium contribution CP , and the second line is lobby As
equilibrium contribution CA.
B. Proof of Proposition 2
Assume that in equilibrium there exists lobby P . Then
P =
(
x j ux (y)  ux
 
yA

>
CPR
z2P dz
)
:
Taking into account the fact that yA  y, the above inequality yields
x >
1
2
 
y + yA +
1
y   yA
CPR
z2P dz
!
:
The denition of an indi¤erent pro-policy individual  yields
 =
1
2
 
y + yA +
1
y   yA
CPR
z2P dz
!
:
The last two equations imply that in equilibrium, lobby P satises
P = fx j x 2 (; 1]g :
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By analogy, if in equilibrium there exists lobby A, then
A =
(
x j ux (y)  ux
 
yP

>
CAR
z2A dz
)
:
Taking into account the fact that y  yP and the denition of an indi¤erent anti-policy
individual , the above inequality yields
x <
1
2
 
yP + y +
1
yP   y
CAR
z2A dz
!
= :
Therefore, in equilibrium, lobby A satises
A = fx j x 2 [0; )g :
C. Proof of Proposition 3
By the denition of indi¤erent pro- and anti-policy individuals  and ,
u (y
 (; ; ))  u
 
yA (; )

=
CP (; ; )R 1
 dz
;
u (y
 (; ; ))  u
 
yP (; )

=
CA (; ; )R 
0 dz
:
Plugging in the expressions for y (; ; ), yP (; ), yA (; ), CP (; ; ) and C

A (; ; )
from Corollary 1 yields a system of two equations with two unknowns  and :
(1  )2  1 + +  +   2   2   1    2 + 3 + 3  2
4 (2 +   ) (1 + )2 = 0; (C.1)
2
  1 + 2 + 6  3  2   1 + 2 + 2    2
4 (2 +   ) (2  )2 = 0:
Note that
1 + +  +   2   2
4 (2 +   ) (1 + )2 6= 0;
 1 + 2 + 2    2
4 (2 +   ) (2  )2 6= 0
for 0 <      < 1. Therefore, (C.1) simplies to
 = 1; 1 + + 2 + 2   3 (1 + ) = 0;
 = 0; 1  2 + 2   3 (2  ) = 0;
and yields the following solutions:
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1.  = 1,  = 0 no lobbies organized.
2.  = 1,  = 23 one anti-policy lobby organized.
3.  = 13 +
2
3,  = 0 one pro-policy lobby organized.
4. ,  such that
1 + + 2 + 2   3 (1 + ) = 0; (C.2)
1  2 + 2   3 (2  ) = 0
two lobbies organized.
Consider the last case, where there are two organized lobbies. Note that the functions
(C.2) have continuous partial derivatives with respect to ,  and . Moreover, the following
Jacobian determinant is nonzero:
jJ j 

@(1++2+2 3(1+))
@
@(1++2+2 3(1+))
@
@(1 2+2 3(2 ))
@
@(1 2+2 3(2 ))
@
 =
18  7   62 + 15+ 4  62;
which is strictly positive for 0 <    < 1. Then, by the implicit function theorem, the
equilibrium values  () and  () are implicit functions of  that satisfy (C.2).
Figure 1 depicts the behavior of the functions (C.2) for di¤erent levels of the governments
preferred policy . (The shaded area corresponds to     .) An equilibrium exists for
moderate levels of  such that  ()     (). First,  ()   yields numerically
  0:299554  0:3. Second,    () yields numerically   0:700446  0:7. Thus, an
equilibrium  (),  () exists for  2 [0:3; 0:7].
D. Proof of Proposition 4
I use the implicit function theorem to nd
d
d
=
1
jJ j
  
@(1++2+2 3(1+))
@
@(1++2+2 3(1+))
@
 @(1 
2+2 3(2 ))
@
@(1 2+2 3(2 ))
@
 =
14  12 + 4
18  7   62 + 15+ 4  62 ;
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which is strictly positive for 0 <    < 1, and
d
d
=
1
jJ j

@(1++2+2 3(1+))
@  
@(1++2+2 3(1+))
@
@(1 2+2 3(2 ))
@  
@(1 2+2 3(2 ))
@
 =
6  4 + 12
18  7   62 + 15+ 4  62 ;
which is strictly positive for 0 <    < 1.
For the equilibrium policy level,
dy
d
=
@y
@
d
d
+
@y
@
d
d
+
@y
@
=
40  64 + 292   23 + 56  50+ 142+ 372   142 + 23 + 8 (1     )
(2   + )2 (18  7   62 + 15+ 4  62) ;
which is strictly positive for 0 <      < 1.
Finally, consider the lobbiesequilibrium contributions:
dCP
d
=
@CP
@
d
d
+
@CP
@
d
d
+
@CP
@
=
(1  )  1 + +  +   2   2
2 (2   + )3 (1 + )2 (18  7   62 + 15+ 4  62) 
( 58 + 65 + 102   313 + 104   163+ 125+ 592  513+ 104  1472 +
512 + 8422   2232   153   393 + 3423 + 284   264 + 45 + 52  
70 + 262   43 + 130   138 + 242 + 802   602 + 83);
which is strictly negative for 0 <      < 1, and
dCA
d
=
@CA
@
d
d
+
@CA
@
d
d
+
@CA
@
=

 
1  2+   2 + 2
2 (2   + )3 (2  )2 (18  7   62 + 15+ 4  62) 
(24  40   22 + 363   224 + 45 + 138  209+ 242+ 753  264 
332 + 1282   12022 + 3432   283 + 553   2223   204 + 104 +
48   80 + 442   83 + 180   210 + 602 + 382   242 + 43);
which is strictly positive for 0 <      < 1.
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E. Proof of Corollary 2
First, consider the case of a utilitarian government, where  = 0:5. The system (C.2) yields
the following closed-form solution for  = 0:5:
 =
9 p17
8
;
 =
 1 +p17
8
:
Then, for  = 0:5,
y =
2 + 2   2
2 (2 +    ) = 0:5;
CP =
(1  )2   +  +    22
4 (1 + ) (2 +    )2 =
199  47p17
512
;
CA =
2
 
2  2+   22
4 (2  ) (2 +   )2 =
199  47p17
512
:
Therefore, 1   = , CP = CA and y =  for  = 0:5.
Second, consider the cases of anti-policy ( < 0:5) and pro-policy ( > 0:5) governments.
Since 1   is a decreasing function of  and  is an increasing function of ,
1   >  1 +
p
17
8
and  <
 1 +p17
8
for  < 0:5) 1   >  for  < 0:5;
1   <  1 +
p
17
8
and  >
 1 +p17
8
for  > 0:5) 1   <  for  > 0:5:
Next, consider the lobbies equilibrium contributions. Since CP decreases with  and C

A
increases with ,
CP >
199  47p17
512
and CA <
199  47p17
512
for  < 0:5) CP > CA for  < 0:5;
CP <
199  47p17
512
and CA >
199  47p17
512
for  > 0:5) CP < CA for  > 0:5:
For the equilibrium policy level, note that
d (y   )
d
=
1
(2   + )2 (18  7   62 + 15+ 4  62) 
( 32 + 36 + 72   193 + 64   76+ 58+ 252  163  172  
172 + 2022 + 113   163 + 64 + 8 (1     ))
is strictly negative for 0 <      < 1. Therefore, y    decreases with . Since
y    = 0 for  = 0:5,
y    > 0 for  < 0:5;
y    < 0 for  > 0:5:
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